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 Pipe dreams: eternal recurrence and simulacrum 
in Foucault's ekphrasis of Magritte 
GARY SHAPIRO 
Michel Foucault invokes Andy Warhol at the conclusion 
of This u Not a Pipe; this comes at the end of a chapter 
entitled 'Seven Seals of Affirmation,' so that the words 
must be read with a Nietzschean resonance (recalling 
Zarathustra's 'The Seven Seals'): 
A day will come when, by meam of similitude relayed 
indefinitely along the length of a series, the 1mage itself, 
along with the name it bears, will lose its identity. Campbell, 
Campbell, Campbell, Campbell.' 
I propose to explore the approach to the visual here which 
proceeds by deploying or presupposing conceptions of 
similitude, simulacrum, eternal recurrence and affirmation 
that are variations on thoughts of Nietzsche and Gilles 
Deleuze. In doing so I will read Foucault's essay on 
Magritte as an instance of ekphrasis, that is as a verbal 
text which aims at describing, simulating or evoking a 
visual work of art. What will be unusual about this 
variation on the ancient genre of d.-phrasis will be 
Foucault's claim that Magritte's painting already speaks; 
the consequence is a significant complication in the task 
of the writer on art. 
Foucault's reading of Magritte is by no means the 
importation of philosophy into an alien context. Magritte's 
art is from the start a form of seduction and provocation 
directed towards philosophy. The painting and inscription 
that find their way into Foucault's title seem to put into 
question the very possibility of reference and the relation-
ship between language and the world. Another painting, 
Hegel's Holiday, depicting an open umbrella supporting a 
glass of water, suggests perhaps that the philosopher is 
above all interested in producing a shelter against alterity 
and accident; even when on vacation he does not forget 
his Regmschinn ('rain-shield,' more expressive here than 
'urnbrella'). 0 La philosophu dans u boudmr echoes Sade's title; 
its nightgown with breasts of flesh and its high-heeled 
shoes with real toes also, like so much of Magritte's work, 
pose an undecidable oscillation between the inside and 
the outside, appearance and reality, the drapery or 
covering and the naked truth presumed to underlie it. If 
there are temptations to philosophy here, it is important 
to note that they no longer include somr. of thr familiar 
gestures toward a philosophy of the visual found in earlier 
painting. The issue of a reciprocity of gazes that arises in 
Las Mmmas, where we are uncertain as to whether and 
how the positions of model, painter and spectator intersect, 
is not present. Nor does Magritte play with any of the 
conventions of self-portraiture which explore the possibility 
of man attaining self-knowledge. The image now is left on 
its own. 
Indeed, it is this tendency of the image to float free that 
is implicit throughout the rhetoric of Foucault's essay. In 
discussing the 1966 painting, Lts rkux mysthes, in which a 
pipe drawn on a blackboard with the inscription 'Cm n'est 
pas une pipe' is echoed, supplemented and contradicted by 
the image of a larger pipe that seems suspended above it 
in the air, he speaks of the latter as 'floating,' as a 'simple 
notion or fantasy of a pipe,' and asks whether it is an 
'emanation, a mist just detaching itself from the painting.'3 
This language might appear metaphorical or even whim-
sical, which it is; but it also stands in a rather rigorous 
relation to the conception of the simulacrum developed 
by Deleuze, and by that intermediary Foucault is putting 
Magritte into dialog with a certain 'anti-Platonic' aspect 
of Plato and with Lucretius' theory of perception. Deleuze 
had written of Alice's Advmtures r.n Wonderland, proposing to 
explain its paradoxical logic and texture by introducing 
certain Stoic concepts of the event and the surface and 
had spoken of 'the faint incorporeal mist that escapes from 
bodies, a film without volume that envelops them. '4 (In 
general, there is a strong parallel between Deleuze 's 
reading of Lewis Carroll and Foucault's of Magritte: both 
the writer and the painter emerge as artists of the surface 
and the simulacrum.) This dialogue continues when 
Foucault goes on to speak of a form that 'reascends to the 
ethereal realm,' of similitudes being 'born of their own 
vapor and ... ris[ing] endlessly into an ether where they 
refer to nothing more than to themselves. '5 
An appendix to Deleuze's Th Logu ef Sm.re, 'The 
Simulacrum and Ancient Philosophy,' begins by asking 
what it might mean to follow Friedrich Nietzsche's injunc-
tion to reverse Platonism. In going back to a neglected 
theme in Plato himself and to Lucretius, something of an 
outsider in relation to the canons of philosophy, Deleuze 
proposes to excavate possibilities from within the philo-
sophical tradition for valuing a certain multiplicity, 
WORD & IMAGE, VOL. 13, NO. I, JANUARY-MARCH 1997 69 
possibilities that have been neglected by the hegemonic 
form of the tradition itself. Deleuze focuses his efforts at 
first on a reading of Plato's Sophist. In this dialogue an 
important dIstinction between the legitimate icon or copy 
on the one hand, and the wayward phantasm or simulac-
rum on the other, is illustrated by an analogy drawn from 
the visual arts As Deleuze observes, 'the Platonic dialectic 
is neither a dialectic of contradiction nor of contrariety, 
but a dialectic of rIvalry (amphisbeUsis), a dialectic of rivals 
and suitors.,I; The rivalry when vision is in question is not 
only one between philosophy and its competitors but also 
one that takes place among various forms of the visual. 
There is a hierarchy of visual powers, productions and 
forms of knowledge, including dreams, reflections, illu-
sions, objects perceived in a variety of contexts and 
perspectives, healthy and diseased eyes, and the eye of the 
soul. In the Sophist the Stranger asks: 
And what shall we say of human art? Do we not make one 
house by the art of building, and another by the art of 
drawing, which is a sort of dream created by man for those 
who are awake?' 
In what might be called a strong reading of the dialogue, 
Deleuze sees the SophLSt as releasing these dreams, as 
Plato's thought is shaken by the possibility that there may 
be no absolute model to which various images must 
be referred: 
.. it may be that the end of the Sophut contains the mo~t 
extraordinary adventure of Platol1lsm: as a consequence of 
searching in the direcllon of thc sunulacrum and of leaning 
over its abyss, Plato discovers, in the flash of an instant, 
that the simulacrum 15 not simply a false copy, but that it 
places in question thc very notIOns of copy and model. B 
It is this disturbance that creates an opening for the 
Nietzschean project, for' "to reverse Platonism" means to 
make the simulacra rise and to affirm their rights among 
icons and copies.'9 And in a move that will echo (or be 
simulated) in Foucault's essays on Deleuze and Magritte, 
and in his remarks on Warhol, this rise of the simulacrum 
is associated with the eternal recurrence and exemplified 
by the phenomenon of Pop Art. Here the recurrence is 
understood not as a way of orgamzing chaos hut as the 
circulation of simulacra; in the eternal recurrence there is 
no genuine or authentic model of which the infinitely 
many recurrences or simulacra are copies. The recurrence 
might be rethought as the reign of the simulacrum itself 
and the expulsion of the Platonic model: 
.. it does not make ronything come back. It is still selective, 
it 'makes a difference,' but not at all in the manner of Plato. 
What is selected are all the procedures opposed to selection; 
what is excluded, what is made not to return, is that which 
presupposes the Same and the Similar, that which pretends 
to correct divergence, to recenter the circles or order the 
chaos, and to provide a model or make a copy 
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Modermty is said to be 'defined by the power of the 
simulacrum' (in 1969, the date of Deleuze's work, there 
was no talk of the postmodern). In this connection a 
distinction is made between the artificial, which is in good 
Platonic terms simply 'a copy of a copy,' and the simulac-
rum, for which that hlerarchy no longer obtains. That 
which might appear at first as artificial can be transformed 
or transvalued: 'The artificial is always a copy of a copy, 
which should be pushed to /he pomt where It changes lis naturr 
and is rrotmd mto 1M sltnuWrum (the moment of Pop Art)."o 
If Warhol's images at first appear to be merely copies, 
reproductions of well-known images of Coca-Cola bottles, 
or of photographers' shots of Marilyn or Elvis, this marks 
their status as artifice; but what appears as artificial from 
a Platonic perspective can be 'reversed' by a mode of 
presentation that makes it multiply and proliferate indefin-
itely so as to erase what would have been its sourel' 
and center. 
Foucault develops Deleuze's suggestions about the role 
of the simulacrum in pop art in his essay 'Theatrum 
Philosophicum,' which is devoted to a review of Deleuze's 
Difference alld &petitum and The Logic qf Smse. Foucault sees 
Andy Warhol's art as genuinely revelatory in a way that 
complements his analysis of Magritte: 
Thi~ is the greatness of Warhol with his cannt"o foods, 
senseless aCCidents, and his series of advertising smiles: the 
oral and nutritional eqUlvalence of those half-open lips, 
teeth, tomato sauce, that hygiene based on detergents, tht" 
equivalence of death in the cavity of an eviscerated car, at 
the top of a telephone pole and at the end of a wire, and 
between the glistemng, steel blue arms of the electric chair. 
'It's the same either way,' stupidity 5ays, while smking into 
itself and infinitely extending its nature WIth the thin~ it 
says of itself; 'Here or there, it's always the same thing, 
what difference if the colors vary, if they're darker or lighter. 
It'5 all so senseless - life, women, death! How ridiculom 
this stupidity!' But in concentrating on thiS boundle~s mono-
tony, we find the sudden illumination of multiplicity itself -
WIth nothing at its center, at its highest point, or beyond it 
- a flickering of light that travels even faster than the eyes 
and successively lights up the moving label~ and the captive 
snapshots that refer to each other to eternity, without ever 
saying anything: suddenly, arising from the background of 
the old inertia of equivalences, the 5triped form of the event 
tean through the darkness, and the eternal phantasm 
informs that soup can, that singular and depthless face." 
I suggest that we understand the 'eternal phantasm' as the 
simulacrum in its recurrence. Repeated infinitely, it liber-
ates the image from its official or original meaning and 
allows the emergence of a sheer multiplicity. 
What neither Foucault nor Deleuze explicitly note in 
their juxtaposition of Nietzsche's thought of the recurrr:nce 
to a certain transformation of the visual image, is that this 
association is already present in Zarathustra's most 
extended speech on the recurrence, whose title already 
 
indicates an optical theme: 'Vonz G~suht und Railzsd "0 What 
recurs in the recurrence, let us recall, is the Augenblick, 
usually translated somewhat blandly as the 'moment' but 
it has the literal sense of a twinkling of the eye or the 
interval of visual attentIOn between blinkings. Nietzsche 
sets a specifically visual scene for Zarathustra's confronta-
tion with the dwarf who embodies the spirit of gravity 
here, describing a walk through 'the deadly pallor of 
twilight' that leads to a gate that bears the Inscription 
Augmhluk and at which two paths confront or abut one 
another. At this gateway Zarathustra challenges the dwarf 
to say what he sees and he replies dismiSSlvely (as 'stupidity' 
responds to Warhol's multiples in Foucault's scenario): 
'''All that IS straight lies," the dwarf murmured contemptu-
ously. "All truth is crooked; time itself is a circle.'" The 
dwarf voices a certain conception of the eternal recurrence, 
one that assimilates it to the familiar figure of the circle. 
He sees both more and less than Zarathustra sees. More, 
because he claims that straight and divergent lines really 
do circle around to meet. But this more is also less, less 
because seeing the paths as circular eliminates the clash 
and mutual offense that Zarathustra describes. And what 
of the gateway itself, the site of the clash? The dwarf does 
not describe it at all, perhaps he does not notice it. For 
the evil eye that the dwarf embodies (and which is a 
frequent theme in Nietzsche) everythmg is to be levelled 
down: Zarathustra will fall, and each moment will simply 
be submerged in the uniform figure of the circle, a figure 
of perfect equality. The circle is inscribed, but dwarf-
vision overlooks the inscription as it overlooks everything 
specific about the scene. Is not the inscription a doubling 
and a deepening of this moment of vision, this gateway 
that Zarathustra wants to see? 
Zarathustra's question hcrc is 'Is seeing itself not 
seeing abysses?' (1st Sehm nicht sethtr - Abgrundt sehm.~. To 
see abysses is to become aware of the absence or failure 
of the ground, not to pass lightly over the moment of 
vision but to see it as a nzise-m-abilm. Sight requires courage 
in such conditions, since we are constantly threatened by 
vertigo when looking into an abyss. So Zarathustra asks, 
in framing his story, 'Courage also destroys vertigo 
(Scfu.vi.ndel) at abysses; and where does man not stand at 
an abyss?' This is perhaps the courage of vision for which 
Merleau-Ponty praises Cezanne, the refusal to put up with 
facile solutions and the resolution to explore the complexity 
of the visual. 
Foucault seems to have taken up something of this 
attitude into his generalized ~kphrasis of Warhol, when he 
speaks of the 'eternal phantasm' or 'the striped form of 
the event.' Mark Taylor has said that art like Warhol's 
exhibits a style of thought that he calls 'logo centrism,' 
that is a stress on the recognizable logo or label of the 
celebrity, commodity, instantly recognizable symbol, or 
scene that constitutes the occasion for a multiplication of 
the image. '3 ""'hat Foucault wants to say about these 
images, apparently produced to infinity, is that it is 
precisely the form of their presentatlon, multiplication, 
and indefinite proliferation that releases them from the 
circle of the logo and precipitates an abyssal vision that 
calls for a focus on the moment of vision, just as the 
thought of eternal recurrence is meant to provoke an 
attention to experiences that goes beyond fitting them into 
one or another conventional narratives that we might tell 
about our lives. This is what Foucault says about that 
thought, just a few pages after the passage on Warhol: 
As for the Return, must it be the perfect circle, the welJ-
OIled millstone, which turns on its axiS and remtroduces 
things, forms, and men at their appointed time? Must there 
be a center and must events occur on its periphery? 
perhaps like the young ~hepherd we must break this circular 
ruse - like Zarathustra himself who bit off the head of the 
serpent and immediately spat it away ... Aeon [the Stoic 
contrast to Chronos, of which Deleuze writes 1 is UCUTTmce 
itself, the straight lme of time, a splittmg quicker than 
thought and narrower than any instant It causes the same 
present to arise - on both sides of thiS indefimtely splitting 
arrow - as always existing, as indefinitely present, and as 
indefinite future '. 
It is this conception of the recurrence that also contributes 
to Foucault's analysis of the circulation of similitudes m 
Magritte, and to his announcement that: 
A day v{ill come when, by means of ~imilitude relayed 
indefinitely along the length of a senes, the lIllage itself, 
along with the name It bears, will lme its identity. 
Foucault's last book before the Magritte essay, us mots et 
its choses (the title poorly translated as Tht Ordtr qf Thmgs), 
had also concluded with the apocalyptic pronouncement, 
described again as an effacement or erasure, 'that one can 
certainly wager that man would be erased, like a face 
drawn in sand at the edge of the sea. "5 These two 
vanishing acts are intimately connected in so far as it is 
the same factors that will destabilize the reign of man and 
that of the representational image. Let us look more 
carefully now at the argument of This is Not a Pipe with 
these erasures in mind. 
At the beginning of Foucault's bravura ekphrases of the 
two versions of the painting that include those words, he 
wants to insist that the genre presupposed by what we are 
beholding is not the painting or picture in general, but 
the calligram. Especially the second painting, the one with 
two pipes (or their images, their simulacra) must be 
understood as based on a fusion of the visual and the 
linguistic, the imaged and the written: 'The operation is 
a calligram that Magritte has secretly constructed, then 
carefully unraveled . .,6 From the outset, then, Foucault's 
essay will have complicated the traditions and conventions 
of the rkphraru, just as Magritte's painting will have 
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deformed some of the conventions and traditions of the 
Western pictorial mode since the Renaissance. For the 
~kphra.fl5 ordinarily supposes that the writer (possibly a 
poet, critic, or philosopher) makes a painting speak; the 
account that he or she provides gives a voice to that which 
is silent (as Andre Malraux, for example, becomes a 
ventriloquist for Th VoiGtS of Szlence). But if what is to be 
described alrwl{y speaks, indeed if it seems to speak of 
itself, then the writer is not bringing a voice to the 
voiceless, but entering into a conversation already begun. 
In the calligram, words and letters are arranged so as to 
suggei>t forms that evoke objects or themes that are 
themselves topics of or commentaries on their text. 
Eventually Foucault will suggest that Magritte's pipe paint-
ings are responses to one of Apollinaire's calligrams, 
'Fumees,' that itself orders some of its words into the 
shape of a pipe. The calligram then challenges the very 
conditions that make the ~kphrasis possible: 
The calhgram use~ that capacity of letters to signify both as 
linear clcmcn~ that can be arranged in ~pace dud as signs 
that romt unroll accordmg to a unique chain of sound. As a 
sign, the letter permits us to fix word~; as lme, lt lets us give 
shape to things. Thm the calligram ~pire~ playfully to efface 
the olde~t oppmitioru of our alphabetical civilizauon: to 
show and to name; to shape and to say; to reproduce and to 
articulate; to imitate and to signify; to look and to read. '7 
Let us recall that Zarathustra's discourse on the abyss 
involved in all seeing is also based on a vision which, if 
not precisely a calligram, also mixes inscription and image. 
The problem of naming or inscribing the moment, which 
is graphically presmted by the word Augmbluk on the 
gateway, is a disruption of the topoz of reference, index-
icality, and temporality in Western thought. Already an 
ingredient in Heraclitus' sayings is the impossibility of 
holding fast the passing moment, a theme that received a 
magisterial treatment from Augustine, who insisted on the 
impossibility of naming the present, which must immedi-
ately escape before its name is pronounced. Hegel, at the 
beginning of the Phmamenolog:y of Spznt, proposes that one 
who believes in the fullness and cognitive certainty of the 
moment ought to try the experiment of writing down or 
describing that realization; experience will teach that 'now 
it is night' or 'now it is day' will be quickly falsified by the 
passage of time. The inscription on Zarathustra's gateway 
offers an affront to these philosophies, by writing the name 
of the moment, Augmblick, in stone. The dwarf produces 
a variant of the standard philosophical response to the 
problematic by insisting on the movement or flow of time 
and neglecting the inscription of the moment, its intensity 
or haecceiJa..s. 
Lessing attempted to justify and codify the distinction 
between the plastic and the verbal modes of art in his 
Laocoon. The former is attached to the privileged or frozen 
moment, the latter can be dramatic and narrative; from 
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this perspective it is a mistake to tell a story with a picture 
or to paint with words. Homer is right not to describe 
Helen's appearance but to let us know the effect it has on 
the Trojan elders. All of this is broken down in Nietzsche, 
Foucault and Magritte. The paradox of Magritte's inscrip-
tion, like Zarathustra's, is that It subverts the function of 
the 'legend,' that which is to be read: 
... Magntte seemingly returns to the simple correspondence 
of the unage with its legend. Without saying anythmg, a 
mute and adequately recognizable figure dISplays the object 
in its essence; from the unage, a name written below receives 
i~ 'meaning' or rule for usage. Now, compared to the 
traditional function of the legend, Magntte's text is doubly 
paradoxical. It sets out to name wmething that evidently 
doe~ not need to be named (the form is too well known, the 
label too familiar). And at the moment when he should 
reveal the name, MagTitte does so by denymg that the 
object IS what it is. 'U 
In Foucault's ekphrasis of Les drux "!ystem, a complicated 
story is told that involves a variety of actions, voices, and 
events. The 'pipe on the blackboard,' accompanied by the 
words' Ceci n 'est pas um pzpe' written in an all too schoolmas-
terly hand, i, taken to be part of a classroom demonstra-
tion. In this case the lesson being taught is an essential 
step in philosophy: do not confuse images and things. The 
picture of a pipe, for all its resemblance to the real thing, 
is certainly not smokable or even tangible. Foucault's 
PTOSOPOPeia. puts this lesson in the mouth of a pedagogue, 
so that the whole scene of instruction becomes animated 
by his interchange with his students. As soon as the teacher 
speaks, he is compelled by the lesson that he would teach 
to criticize what he has just said: 
But why have we introduced the teacher's voice? Because 
scarcely h~ he stated, 'Thl~ ~ a pipe,' before he mmt 
correct himself and stutter, 'This is not a pipe, but a drawing 
of a pipe,' 'This ~ not a pipe but a ~entence saying that 
thiS IS not a pipe,' 'The ~entence "thi~ is not a pipe" ~ not 
a pipe,' 'In the sentence "this IS not a pipe" t.Ius is not a 
pipe: the painting, written sentence, drawing of a pipe - all 
this IS not a pipe.' 
At least since Plato's Cra!Jlus philosophy has been trying 
to teach the lesson that one ought not to assimilate words 
and things, that the order of language must not be 
confounded with that of the world. And yet as soon as the 
philosopher speaks, even if the lesson is well taken, ques-
tions can arise about that speech itself: the problems that 
were expelled from the object language may surface in 
the meta-language. Of course the regress can be brought 
to a halt by invoking something like Russell's theory of 
types, so that rigorous distinctions can be enforced between 
the various levels of language. But this break may seem 
abrupt and artificial; if the status of the meta-language is 
left open, the conscientious philosopher may have worries 
like the teacher in Foucault's scenario. 
 
In all of this concern for preclSlon in speech and the 
avoidance of error, there is a certain obsession with that 
which is excluded. We might say that the progressive 
attempt5 to evade the false identification of words, images, 
paintings, indexical signs, and inscriptions with their 
objects or referents are haunted by the specter that they 
seek to exorcise. And this is the very scene that Foucault 
sees Magritte as enacting for us: 
Negations multiply themselves, the voice is confmed and 
choked. The baffled master lowers his extended pointer, 
turns his back to the board, regards the uproarious studentl!, 
and does not realize that they laugh so loudly because above 
the blackboard and h~ stammered den!a.ls, a vapor has just 
risen, little by little taking shape and now creating, precisely 
and without a doubt, a pipe. 'A pipe, a pipe,' cry the 
students, stamping away while the teacher, hiS voice smkmg 
ever lower, murmun always with the same obstinacy though 
no one is listening, 'And yet it is not a pipe.' He is not 
mistaken ... 'q 
And yet he is not completely right either, for what he fails 
to acknowledge is the 'vapor,' the floating image or simulac-
rum that complicates his negations and distinctions. The 
pedagogical scene constructed here (is it Magritte's or 
Foucault's?) pertains not only to philosophy's concern with 
language and reference, but to the way in which painting 
has been constituted. The anecdote told of Zeuxis and 
Parrhasius is paradigmatic: the first painted grapes so 
realistic that birds tried to eat them; the latter presented 
him with a draped painting that was to be the rival of that 
one, but the drapery in fact was the painting, and when 
Zeuxis asked for it to be unveiled, he had to confess that 
Parrhasius was the superior painter. Painting has had to 
flirt with the possibility of producing an illusion of the real 
or a substitute for it, while at the same time preserving a 
distance from it (as in the ironic distance of the master of 
the tromp~-lJotil). It is this entire history that is condensed, 
dramatized, and transformed in Foucault's mm-m-sctru. 
In Magritte, says Foucault, we have 'An art of the 
"Same," liberated from the "as if." We are farthest from 
tTOmp~-l'otil. "0 In the longest chapter of his essay 'Seven 
Seals of Affirmation,' he brings together a Nietzschean 
conception of recurrence and affirmation with Deleuze's 
notion of the simulacrum. Everything hinges on the distinc-
tion between resemblance and similitude: 
Resemblance has a 'model,' an original element that orders 
and hlerarchizes the mcrea"ingly less faithful copies that 
can be struck from it. Resemblance presupposes a primary 
reference that prescribes and classifies. The similar develops 
in series that have neither beginning nor end, that can be 
followed in one direction a" ea"ily a" in another, that obey 
no hierarchy, but propagate themselves from small dIffer-
ences, among small differences." 
It is important to note that Foucault is no longer using 
the term 'resemblance' in the same way that he did in Us 
mots et Us chos~. There, resemblance and similitude were 
both modes of the analogical thinkmg of the Renaissance, 
in which the world is seen as a great web of corresponding 
parts and aspects, linking texts and thmgs and microcosm 
and macrocosm. Magritte wrote to Foucault after the 
publication of the earlier book, urging a distinction 
between resemblance and similitude, according to which 
things may or may not have relations of similitude with 
one another (green peas being hiS example of such things) 
but 'Only thought resembles. It resembles by being what 
it sees, hears, or knows; it becomes what the world offers 
It. ". Magritte seems to be concerned to formulate a 
general distinction between two relations here and does 
not attend to the archaeologically specific context of 
Foucault's discussion of the way in which premodern 
knowledge was organized. In ThIS is Not a Pip~ the philo-
sopher uses 'resemblance' to designate a relationship of 
copying, in which a picture, for example, resembles its 
original by both referring to it and by looking like it. 
Similitude, on the other hand, has become strictly a 
relation among images without any reference to an 
external model or a primary instance.'3 
The difference between resemblance and similitude 
could be described in economic terms as a distinction 
between appropriation and circulation. Resemblance 
refers back to an original, to which it belongs and to 
which it remains subordinate. Similitude is a continuous 
movement that 'circulates the simulacrum as an indefinite 
and reversible relation of the similar to the similar.' What 
has been erased in similitude is any trace of monarchy or 
sovereignty; when Foucault says that the latter notions 
have no place in Magritte, there is surely an echo of the 
essay on Las Mmmas, in which the position of the sovereign 
and the claims of representalion are intimately bound 
together. In discussing the ironically titled Repmmtatwn 
Foucault notes how a smaller part of the painting, framed 
by a balustrade, repeats precisely the scene of the larger 
painting. The title and the miu-m-abim~ structure make 
this work into a tableau of representation or visual pre-
sentation itself (representation here is reduced to the 
presentation of similitude), analogous to the function that 
Velazquez's painting has with respect to the classical 
episteme. Foucault remarks that the two images in their 
similitude are sufficient to generate an infinite series, and 
consequently to abolish any sovereign or monarchical 
principle: 
Even as the exactness of the image functioned as a finger 
pointing to a model, to a sovereign, unique and exterior 
'pattern,' the series of Similitudes (and two are enough to 
establish a series) abolishes this simultaneously real and 
ideal monarchy.'~ 
And he asks 'Is it not the role of resemblance to be the 
sovereign that makes things appear?"5 
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\A/e can now begIn to see that there is an analogy 
between more overtly political regimes of vision and the 
forms taken by visual art. In the age of sovereignty, as 
Foucault emphasized in Dtsclplll1.t and Punish, it is the 
sovereign, his proxy, or the effects of his power which are 
put on display; this is also the grand age of the portrait, 
first of royal or aristocratic personages, second, and by 
approximation, of the successful bourgeoisie. In Las 
Mminas, as described by most commentators (and Foucault 
does not exclude this interpretation), the painter and some 
of the other figures depicted seem to have paused in their 
activities to give their attention to the king and queen 
who have just entered the room. They, or their images 
on the canvas (and we need not decide between these two 
possibilities) are reflected in the mirror at the back of the 
room (and that framed image may even be the painting 
of a mirror,5); the painting as a whole embodies the 
aesthetics of sovereignty both in its commitment to resemb-
lance and in its presentation of the panorama of royal 
power - king and queen, princess, attendants and 
Velazquez himself who is both an artist of resemblance 
and an ambitious courtier whose painting has plausibly 
been read as an attempt to provide a royal legitimization 
for the art of painting as well as to certify his own position 
at court.'7 
According to Foucault, sovereignty has been replaced 
in the carceral society by a structure of power in which 
there is no central figure on display. There is a uniformity 
enforced by the architectures, regulations, and protocols 
of power which circulate without end; the gaze has been 
mobilized and is no longer exclusively exercised by or 
directed at anyone person. The art of similitude proceeds 
by means of an analogous circulation of images that have 
been cut loose from any original. Power, as Foucault likes 
to insist, is productive and not merely repressive (as the 
theories based on sovereignty declare); this principle has 
consequences at several levels. If panoptic machinery 
produces delinquencies, docile bodies and perversions, 
the art of circulating similitudes has the power to 
eviscerate the supposed original meaning of the image 
and to force upon us the sense of an indefinite repetition. 
In this mode of repetition and the simulacrum, 'Similitude 
multiplies different affirmations, which dance together, 
tilting and tumbling over one another. ,,8 The echo of 
the rhetoric of dancing and affirmation from the descrip-
tions of the eternal recurrence in Zarathustra seems more 
than accidental (see the chapters 'The Convalescent,' 
'The Other Dancing Song,' and 'The Seven Seals [or 
The Yes and Amen Song'). It is in this spirit that Foucault 
explains how the drawing that resembles a pipe and 
the text that resembles a text subvert their own re-
semblance in order to generate 'an open network of 
similitudes' in which explicit negations are transvalued 
into affirmations: 
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Each element of 'thiS is not a pipe' could hold an apparently 
negative discourse - because it denies, along with resemb-
lance, the asserUon of reality re5emblance conveys - but 
one that i~ basically affirmative: the affirmation of the 
Simulacrum, affirmatIOn of the element within the network 
of the slmilar."4 
Foucault then proposes to 'establish the series of these 
affirmations,' by exploring the different voices that speak 
in 'thi~ is not a pipe.' Affirmation is always multiple 
because it is beyond limit and restriction. Nietzsche had 
asked 'Now that God is dead, who IS speaking?', suggesting 
that with the disappearance of the sovereign center there 
is no longer an authoritative subject to ground texts or 
utterances (as in the higher criticism of the Bible or the 
Homeric question that are paradigmatic for his own work 
as a philologist). In the wake of the decline of resemblance, 
which is linked to the fate of sovereignty, Foucault asks of 
Magritte's painting 'Who speaks in the statement?' and 
proceeds to detail seven speakers: the lower pipe, the 
higher pipe, the inscription, the texl and the lower pipe 
in unison, the two pipes speaking together, the text and 
the higher pipe, and a 'dislocated voice' that speaks of all 
the pamting's elements. If the lower pipe inSISts that it is 
only a drawing, this insistence is echoed and amplified by 
the higher one which acknowledges itself to be a 'cloudy 
similitude, referring to nothing,' and the other voices add 
their own variations, 'tilting and tumbling over one 
another.' In 'The Seven Seals' of Nietzsche's ;:,arathustra, 
the speaker disperses himself into various voices and 
functions (e.g. 'If I am fond of the sea ... ,' 'If my virtue 
is a dancer's virtue ... ,' 'If ever I spread tranquil skies 
over myself ... '). What all the voices affirm, in chorus, is 
the eternal recurrence, the infinite depth of the moment 
that is experienced as repeated without limit. The moment-
of-vision or twinkling of the eye (Augmblick) is no longer a 
mere appearance to be grounded upon or to refer to 
a more substantial reality; it has acquired its own depth. 
This is analogous to what happens to similitude among 
the seven affirmations - 'seven discourses in a single 
statement' - that issue from Magritte's painting: 
Henceforth sirmlitude l..S restored to Jt5elf - unfolding from 
itself and folding back upon Itself. It is no longer the finger 
pointing out from the canva.5 in order to refer to something 
else. It inaugurate5 a play of transferences that run, prolifer-
ate, propagate, and correspond withm the layout of the 
painting, affirming and repre5enting nothmg. 30 
Let us be careful about this 'affirming and representing 
nothing.' It is not that there is no affirmation, Foucault 
seems to be saying here, but that nothing !S affirmed. It is 
the affirmation of similitude as sheer image, emptied of 
meaning and reference. In 'Theatrum Philosophicum' 
Foucault had spoken of'the sudden illumination ofmultipli-
city itself - with nothing at its center, at its highest point, 
 
or beyond it.' Foucault might seem to teeter here on the 
brink of nihilIsm, recalling Nietzsche's principle that 'man 
would rather will nothingness than 110/ will.'3' The disap-
pearance of the center could be taken as a cause for 
lamentation or as the impetus for a series of desperate 
efforts to substitute another version of the center for the 
one that has been lost. Or it might be celebrated as it is 
here in the form of a dance of sImilitude. Characteristically, 
Foucault speaks in the passage quoted above of the fold 
(Pli) of similitude, 'unfolding from itself and folding back 
upon itself.' The notion of the fold is somewhat elusive, 
but it ~eems to designate what happens when resistance 
becomes itself a structure of power; it is not interiority in 
the classical sense of subjectivity, but the inside of the 
outside, a doubling. As Deleuze suggests, Foucault's late 
analysis of thc Greeks outlines a form of doubling in which 
one gains mastery over oneself; the UJ~ of pleasurc is not to 
be driven by It, but to take it as an occasion for self-
regulation.)' Magritte's or Warhol's folding of simihtude 
means that images are no longer simply the product of 
external forces to which they refer or which cause them, 
but that they exhibit themselves as images, achieving a 
relaLive independence from what is outside. Foucault makes 
some analogous observations about the photography of 
Duane Michals in an introduction to a book of his work: 
For Duane Michals, grasping reality, captunng movement, 
taking from life, mducing to see ... are the traps of 
photography: a fah~ compul~ion, a clum~y desire, having 
illusiom about yourself. For a long time the photo-
grapher's gaze has monopolized the practice of photography 
and impos~d It5 own law 
The fold practiced or embodied by Michals is that he 
'undertakes to cancel out what one might call the ocular 
function of photography' by means of 'a whole series of 
more or less complex games in which the lens constantly 
allows the visible to escape it.' These consist in such 
strategies as photographing the evanescent, the ghostly or 
the invisible; or in complicating the visual by adding 
written inscriptions or painting over part of the photo-
graph. 33 The cancelling of the ocular, like the avoidance 
of resemblance, is the folding of an an. Foucault's short 
essay on Michals appeared in 1982, just two years after 
Roland Barthes' Gamaa LucuJa, which also asks the question 
whether photography can be an art, but which holds to 
the principle that a photograph is necessarily the record 
or trace of an actual event or stimulus (the exposure of 
the film) and never confronts the possibility that the 
photographic work could be folded in on itself. 
In praising Magritte, Warhol, or Michals, Foucault 
appears to embrace Zarathustra's dictum that 'all vision 
is seeing abysses,' summoning up a world in which the 
identity of the image disappears in a vertigo of repetitions, 
along with the figure of man who would have served as 
the stabilizing center of the ~i&o. The 'I see' seems to 
have gone the way of the 'I think' (the cogl/o). But we may 
still wonder whether some trace or shadow of the viewer 
remains here and, if so, what that observer looks like in 
turn. Notoriously, Foucault thematized his efforts to evade 
identification in the form of a brief dialogue at the close 
of the introduction to 77z~ Archaeology of Knowltdgt. Here 
the unnamed and disembodied voice of the writer speaks 
of preparing a labyrinth for himself, one: 
. in whIch I can lose myself and appear at last to eyes 
that I WIll never have to meet again. I am no doubt not the 
only one who writes m order to have no face. Do not ask 
who I am and do not ask me to remain the same: leave it 
to our bureaucrats and our pohce to see that our papers 
are m order. At least spare us their morality when we wntc.3-I 
And when w~ look is implied by the visual figures here, 
which conjure up the image of the voyeur, who sees from 
the depths of his labyrinth, appears only fleetingly to eyes 
that will never reinspect him and who manages to shed 
his face. But Nietzsche, who preceded Foucault with a 
rhetoric of the labyrinth and the mask, did not always 
imagine that such an escape from the gaze could be 
effected, for he issued this cautionary note: 'when you 
look long into an abyss, the abyss also looks into you. '35 
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